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Collective Bargaining in 
American Industry: A Synthesis 
Clifford B. Donn 
David B. Lip sky 
The preceding eight chapters deal with the current status of collective bargaining in eight U.S. industries. The differences between collec-tive bargaining for police officers and auto workers or between pro-
fessional athletes and college professors are obvious and illustrate the rich-
ness and variety of contemporary collective bargaining. Depite that diversity, 
however, the eight industries exhibit important similarities in collective bar-
gaining. The common themes that link most, if not all, of the industries 
examined in this volume are perhaps less obvious, but a careful reading of the 
preceding chapters reveals that there have been a number of common factors 
affecting collective bargaining in these industries even though the responses 
of the different labor-management pairs have varied. 
This chapter identifies and discusses some of the most important of the 
common themes that emerge from the study of these eight industries. The 
same general framework used to organize each of the industry studies—a 
modification of Dunlop's systems model—is again used here to examine those 
themes. Although most of the topics discussed below will be illustrated with 
examples from at least two of the eight industries, some references will also 
be made to the experience in industries not covered in this book. We conclude 
by discussing the future of collective bargaining in American industry. 
The Bargaining Environment 
Technology 
Technological change has always been a major factor affecting collective bar-
gaining relationships, and the 1980s were no different in that regard. Some 
recent technological changes had a direct effect on bargaining in the 1980s. 
Unions of office and clerical workers, for example, have negotiated special 
conditions for employees who spend substantial amounts of time working at 
computer terminals (Cornfield, forthcoming, and the references cited therein). 
In the maritime industry technological innovation has had a severe effect on 
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employment: containerization has dramatically cut the need for labor in the 
loading and unloading of ships, and other innovations, ranging from corro-
sion resistant materials to larger vessel sizes, have dramatically reduced the 
number of workers required to deliver a given cargo a given distance (Donn 
1986, and the references cited therein). Often, the effect of technological 
change has been more subtle. Most of the industries in this book have 
recently been touched in many ways by technological change. The rubber, 
telecommunications, and automobile industries may be the three where the 
changes were most far-reaching and thus had the most influence on bargain-
ing relationships. 
As Karper documents, the tire industry experienced dramatic changes 
when radial tires replaced bias-ply tires. This change required substantial 
retooling by the tire companies, but retooling was not the source of the 
greatest impact. Rather it was the increased durability of radial tires, which 
reduced the demand for replacement tires, just as a variety of other economic 
factors, such as economic recession and the steady growth of auto imports, 
all combined to reduce the demand for tires on new cars as well. Together 
with these other factors, the change to radial technology helped produce a 
massive contraction of employment in the industry. 
Hendricks discusses the myriad technological advances that have had 
major effects on employment in the telecommunications industry. The mod-
ular assembly of telephone components has reduced the time and skills 
required for telephone repair. The change to electronic switching has reduced 
costs, automated many maintenance and operator functions, and reduced the 
need for central office technicians. The more profound effects of technolog-
ical change, however, have arisen from changes in signal transmission tech-
nology, which have allowed the substitution of microwave transmission for 
traditional signal transmission over wires. As Hendricks emphasizes, these 
changes were instrumental in the deregulation of the industry because much 
of the technological argument for the preservation of a "natural monopoly" 
disappeared. Indeed, the development of this technology makes it feasible for 
large telephone users to by-pass local telephone companies entirely, which 
has had severe implications for the pricing structure of telephone services. 
Katz has pointed to the role of technological change in the auto industry 
in promoting the internationalization of production in that industry. Stan-
dard cars can now be constructed of interchangeable parts manufactured all 
over the world. Management's consequent desire to negotiate more flexible 
work rules in the industry has also been prompted, in part, by its desire to \ 
make greater use of robotics and microelectronic technology. j 
A key to understanding the effect of technological change on collective 
bargaining is to recognize that technological change per se is seldom an issue 
negotiated directly by unions and employers. Some unions, such as those in 
the maritime industry and the printing trades, have in the past tried (and, in 
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general, failed) to block the introduction of new technologies, but this kind 
of Luddite mentality is not characteristic of American unions. Most unions in 
the United States, including those examined in this volume, have been willing 
to give employers virtually a free hand in introducing new machines and new 
methods of production. Instead, they have focused on attempting to control 
the effects of technological change on their constituents, using two basic 
approaches to protect those workers adversely affected. First, they have nego-
tiated work rules, staffing requirements, retraining programs, procedures to 
govern layoffs, transfers, and displacement, controls over "outsourcing" 
(subcontracting), and other procedural devices to mitigate the effects of 
technological change. Second, they have sought compensation, often in the 
form of severance pay, supplemental unemployment benefits, early retire-
ment benefits, or income and job guarantees, to reimburse workers harmed 
by the new technologies (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960, 342-71; 
Somers, Cushman, and Weinberg 1963; Kochan 1980, 435-38). 
The Economic Environment 
There is nothing new in economic instability and nothing new in that insta-
bility having an effect on collective bargaining. The ten years following 1975, 
however, were characterized by economic instability on a scale not witnessed 
since the 1930s. The long post-World War II period of relatively steady 
growth came to an end, with bargaining relationships having to face eco-
nomic challenges more substantial than they had seen in more than 30 years. 
The two most salient economic challenges to collective bargaining in the 
1980s were the recession of the early part of the decade and the growth of for-
eign competition, which had resulted from growing international economic 
interdependence. The apparel and electrical products industries especially 
suffered, and the three manufacturing industries examined in this volume— 
automobiles, agricultural machinery, and tires—as well as the airline indus-
try, all clearly showed the severe effect of recession on collective bargaining 
relationships. The three manufacturing industries also are good examples of 
industries hard hit by foreign competition. 
In the early 1980s the automobile industry suffered its worst contraction 
of output in 40 years because of the combined effects of recession and foreign 
competition. Imports had long been a growing share of the automobile 
market in the United States, but the trickle of imports in the 1960s became a 
flood in the early 1980s just as the recession was shrinking the total size of 
the U.S. automobile market. As Katz explains, the industry responded in a 
variety of ways. Temporary protection from Japanese imports was obtained 
through "voluntary" quotas. Japanese manufacturers were subjected to pres-
sures, not all of them subtle, to do more of their assembly work in the United 
States. American automakers enlisted foreign companies in a variety of joint 
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ventures, ranging from selling foreign-produced vehicles in this country under 
the name of the U.S. manufacturer (Chrysler-Mitsubishi), to joint production 
ventures in the United States (General Motors-Toyota), to the virtual take-
over of a U.S. company by a foreign company (American Motors-Renault). 
Auto imports became the symbol of the public's unhappiness with the 
trade imbalance, especially that with Japan. The response of many of the 
foreign producers has been to move part of their production capacity to the 
United States. General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors had 
been essentially the only domestic producers, but by the mid-1980s Volks-
wagen, Nissan, Toyota, and Mazda all had facilities operating in this country 
or were committed to opening facilities in the near future at locations already 
identified. Some of those companies, such as Volkswagen and Mazda, have 
accepted union representation without strong opposition, while others, such 
as Nissan, have tried to avoid organization. The United Auto Workers has 
tried to meet with the latter producers to allay their fears and assure them 
that cooperative relationships are possible, but obviously the union has not 
persuaded all of them. The success or failure of the innovative UAW-GM 
Saturn agreement may play a key role in determining whether the foreign 
companies take the union's overtures of cooperation seriously. 
The decline in auto sales alone would have made for difficult economic 
times in the tire industry, but along with the switch to radial technology noted 
above, the industry was also hit by the dramatic growth of foreign competi-
tion. The Europeans (Michelin) and the Japanese (Bridgestone) gained large 
shares of the shrinking tire market. Again, the union, the United Rubber 
Workers, agreed to significant local concessions at the negotiating table, but 
that did not prevent most of the major companies from abandoning certain 
segments of the tire market and moving into other, sometimes unrelated, 
product lines. This change in the companies' production strategies placed 
even more pressure on the URW. 
Agricultural machinery companies prospered during the 1970s when 
commodity prices and land values were increasing. But as Seeber explains, 
both of those trends reversed in the first half of the 1980s, causing a marked 
decline in the demand for new farm machinery. The agricultural machinery 
industry was also adversely affected by foreign competition and, perhaps to a 
greater degree, by the near-collapse of the farm economy in the mid-1980s. 
These two forces together reduced employment in the industry by over one- \ 
third between 1979 and 1984. 1 
Airlines have long been especially sensitive to recession. Vacation trav- | 
elers postpone or cancel plans and businesses reduce travel when they need to j 
control costs. The recession of the early 1980s hit the airline industry, as \ 
Cappelli notes, at a time when changes in public policy designed to enhance 
competition in the industry had already disturbed long-standing bargaining : 
relationships. Recession and deregulation combined to bring about the most = 
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dramatic bargaining concessions in American industry and at the same time, 
as in the case of Eastern Airlines, the appointment of union representatives to 
company boards of directors. 
Another factor in the economic environment has been the growing com-
petition of nonunion employers in a variety of industries. Sometimes non-
union competition takes the form of newly created domestic companies oper-
ating in industries that were once entirely or almost completely unionized, as 
in steel and telecommunications. At other times the source of nonunion com-
petition is foreign producers that either export to the United States or build 
nonunion facilities of their own in this country, as in autos and electrical 
products. Deregulation has proven to be a factor that can open a previously 
unionized market to nonunion competition. Trucking is one example of an 
industry once dominated by unionized companies but now facing serious 
competition from nonunion employers (Levinson 1980; Mills and McCor-
mick 1985, 423-63). The growing number of nonunion contractors in major 
segments of the contract construction industry has long been evident; union-
ized construction employers are now almost completely excluded from the 
residential building segment of the market and are losing their share of the 
commercial and even the industrial segments as well (Mills 1980; Mills and 
McCormick 1985, 90-92). Coal mining was once almost totally unionized, 
but more than half of all coal tonnage is now produced by nonunion compa-
nies, most of which are open pit operations west of the Mississippi (Navarro 
1983). Among the industries studied here airlines, automobiles, and tires all 
provide examples of different forms of nonunion competition and different 
methods of addressing it. 
The principal factor leading to the recent increase in nonunion competi-
tion in the airline industry has been deregulation, which has enabled the 
existing local carriers to expand into trunk routes and the new carriers to 
enter those routes as well. A number of the local carriers and new carriers 
have been nonunion, People Express constituting perhaps the archetypical 
example of the new nonunion company. Another employer strategy that has 
to some degree increased nonunion competition in the airline industry 
involves a technique long used in the construction industry, "double breast-
ing." Cappelli notes that a few unionized carriers have spun off their own 
nonunion subsidiaries, which then compete with their unionized divisions. 
Foreign competitors moving to the United States have been the principal 
source of nonunion competition in the tire industry. The United Rubber 
Workers, however, has not as yet had any success in organizing the new 
domestic facilities of Michelin, although the union does represent workers at 
Bridgestone. Of course, as Karper indicates, the domestic producers have 
also moved facilities out of their traditional base in Akron, Ohio. Goodyear, 
Firestone, General, and Uniroyal have all tried to avoid the organization of 
their new facilities. Other unions faced with similar circumstances, such as 
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the United Auto Workers and the United Steelworkers, have reponded in part 
by seeking to organize workers in other industries, but the URW has decided 
to confine its organizing efforts strictly to the rubber industry. To date, the 
union's success has been limited at best. 
Thus, the industry studies contained in this volume serve to illustrate 
how recession, foreign competition, and nonunion domestic competition 
undercut union bargaining power in the 1980s. In industries particularly 
hard hit by those developments, unions suffered the loss of many members. 
To stem the erosion of membership, the unions reluctantly granted wage and 
benefit concessions. In some cases (such as autos) those concessions seemed 
to stanch the loss of members, at least temporarily. But in others (such as 
rubber) union concessions did not sufficiently counter the opposing forces of 
the marketplace, and union power and membership continued to erode. 
The Legal Environment 
In the early years of the Carter presidency, the union movement mounted a 
major effort to persuade Congress to amend the Taft-Hartley Act, the major 
federal statute that directly regulates labor-management relations in the 
private sector. The union movement sought amendments to the statute that 
would expedite certification election procedures and increase the scope of 
remedies for unlawful employer activities. The business community, how-
ever, strongly opposed labor law reform, and the reforms died in the Senate 
in 1978. The subsequent opposition of the Reagan administration has effec-
tively prevented the resurrection of labor law reform in the 1980s, with the 
consequence that the statutory framework governing labor relations in the 
private sector has remained basically unchanged since the Landrum-Griffin 
amendments were added to the Taft-Hartley Act in 1959 (Kochan 1980, 
64-65; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1983, 40-45 and 230-36). 
Nevertheless, changes in other federal statutes, and in state and local 
laws, and rulings and interpretations by administrative agencies and the 
courts significantly affected the public policy context of collective bargaining 
in many industries. For example, Cappelli notes the use of the bankruptcy 
laws by some airline companies to avoid the obligations of existing collective 
bargaining agreements. That strategy was not confined to airlines and was 
one factor that helped precipitate a significant reworking of the federal bank-
ruptcy code. Since 1984 federal law requires that a company that files for 
bankruptcy must negotiate in good faith with its unions on changes in its 
labor contracts and, if it fails to reach agreement, cannot dissolve its con-
tracts without the approval of the federal bankruptcy court {New York Times 
1985a). 
One public policy change that dominated all others in its influence on 
collective bargaining in the 1980s was deregulation. In a process that began 
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in the 1970s and accelerated under the pro-market philosophies of the Reagan 
administration, numerous industries in which competition had been restricted 
found themselves exposed to at least some of the rigors of the market. Among 
our eight industries telecommunications and airlines provide excellent ex-
amples of bargaining relationships that have struggled to adjust to deregula-
tion and have done so in different ways and with different degrees of success. 
For 40 years the airline industry was closely regulated by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, which controlled the routes flown by carriers, the prices they 
charged, and the entry of new carriers into the industry. Then in 1978 Con-
gress passed the Airline Deregulation Act, which over the following several 
years virtually eliminated federal controls in the industry. Soon after passage 
of the act new carriers began to enter into competition with the existing 
carriers. Some of the new carriers (People Express, New York Air, Midway) 
were nonunion, but as Cappelli points out, the nonunion carriers still account 
for only a small portion of the industry's trunk markets. Price and route com-
petition became much more prevalent than in the past, and a wave of mergers 
and acquisitions swept through the industry. The effects of deregulation on 
collective bargaining were dramatic, producing what are probably the most 
profound changes in bargaining relationships and practices of all those 
described in this volume. 
Telecommunications began deregulation and divestiture more recently, 
in 1984, and so their full effects and even the direction of their effects are not 
yet as clear as in the case of airlines. The effects of deregulation on collective 
bargaining in the telephone industry need to be distinguished from the effects 
of divestiture. Only long distance telephone service has been substantially 
deregulated: Local service continues to be regulated by the states. AT&T's 
monopoly over long-distance service has ended, and the down-scaled com-
pany and its unions now face competition for the first time in their history. 
The parties' adjustment has not been easy; serious strikes occurred in both 
the 1983 and 1986 bargaining rounds. By contrast, the regional operating 
companies and their unions continue to be shielded from the full effects of 
competition. Divestiture has, however, allowed each operating company to 
pursue its own collective bargaining strategy, with some seeking cooperative 
relations and others taking a more aggressive stance toward their unions. The 
upshot of these changes is likely to be much more diversity in the terms 
of labor contracts covering workers in the telecommunications industry, 
although it is likely to be several years before this prediction can be verified 
by experience. 
The legal environment of collective bargaining in the public sector is in 
marked contrast with the legal environment in the private sector. With the 
exception of the federal sector statutory regulation of public sector bargain-
ing rests with the states. A majority of states passed statutes governing collec-
tive bargaining by state and local employees in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
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and as Delaney and Feuille explain in their chapter on police, there is little 
uniformity in those statutes across states. The duty to bargain, the scope of 
bargaining, the right to strike, strike penalties, and the methods prescribed 
for resolving impasses all take different forms in different states. Some states 
encourage public sector bargaining; other states discourage or even prohibit 
it. Nevertheless, many of the statutes have been in place for more than a 
decade, so that our understanding of the effects on bargaining of alternative 
policy approaches is well advanced. A salient issue in the case of police is the 
effect of an interest arbitration statute on bargaining outcomes. Delaney and 
Feuille show that police salaries are higher in states with arbitration statutes 
than in states without. Clearly, this kind of evidence has implications not 
only for the policy decisions made in the public sector but also for those made 
in the private sector. 
The Parties 
Over the last two decades union membership contracted in manufacturing, 
mining, and transportation. One result of this contraction was the disappear-
ance of many unions, mostly through merger with other, stronger unions. 
Union mergers affected bargaining in such industries as textiles and apparels, 
nonferrous metals, graphic arts, meatpacking, and the railroads (Janus 1978; 
Chaison 1980). Curiously, this trend did not surface in most of the industries 
included in this volume. Merger was not a strategy pursued by the UAW, 
URW, or CWA, or in education by the NEA and AFT. 
At the same time that unionism was contracting in some sectors, it was 
expanding in others, notably in the public sector, retail trade, services, and 
education. The NEA, for example, grew to 1.9 million members and became 
the largest union in the United States. The AFT, the NEA's rival, reached 
600,000 members. The United Food and Commercial Workers International 
Union—created, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, out of a series of mergers 
of unions in retail and wholesale trade, meatcutting, meatpacking, and 
insurance—became the largest AFL-CIO affiliate. The Service Employees' 
International Union, which organized clerical and service workers in both the 
public and private sectors, also experienced significant growth. The Amer-
ican Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees is another union 
that added significant numbers of new members. As a result the labor move-
ment is no longer dominated by blue-collar workers; today union member-
ship is much more heterogeneous, consisting of large numbers of government 
employees, clerks, service employees, and professionals (Gifford 1982; 
Kokkelenberg and Sockell 1985; New York Times 1985b). j 
Three of the chapters in this book examine occupations or sectors in 
which, until the 1960s, collective bargaining was either nonexistent or rela-
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tively unimportant but, now, is a major means of determining the terms and 
conditions of employment. For example, police officers are the one group of 
workers examined in this volume who are employed entirely in the public 
sector. Twenty-five years ago government employees were less highly union-
ized than employees in most other sectors of the economy; there was little 
statutory support for public employee collective bargaining; and most public 
employers were reluctant to engage in a process they viewed as tantamount to 
ceding their sovereignty. But in the 1980s the public sector, federal as well as 
state and local, is one of the most highly unionized "industries." About 55 
percent of all police officers are unionized, making them one of the most 
highly unionized of the public sector occupations. Collective bargaining is 
widespread, albeit, as Delaney and Feuille make clear, not universal. As the 
chapter on police indicates, public sector collective bargaining is character-
ized by several unique problems of bargaining structure, legal framework, 
issues subject to negotiation, and dispute resolution. 
University professors represent a group for whom collective bargaining is 
still in the relatively early stages of development. As Bacharach, Schmidle, 
and Bauer note, the legal environment has not been entirely supportive of 
bargaining in private universities and colleges; and potential faculty unionists 
often still evince skepticism'about whether the traditional adversarial model 
of bargaining is suitable for them and, if not, whether unions are suitable 
means for faculty to pursue less confrontational forms of workplace gover-
nance. 
Professional athletes are a group for whom collective bargaining is now 
widespread and of major importance. Again, the nontraditional nature of 
bargaining in this industry is apparent in Dworkin's chapter. For example, 
collective bargaining sets minimum salaries, but salaries above the minimum 
remain subject to individual player negotiation. Also particular to this indus-
try is the restriction on the interteam mobility of athletes, which has been 
probably the most controversial and persistent issue in collective bargaining 
in professional sports. 
On the employer side of the table corporate mergers, takeovers, and the 
reorganization of numerous U.S. companies have had a profound effect on 
bargaining relationships. The restructuring of corporations has implications 
for the coverage of collective bargaining agreements and for the obligation of 
the employer to bargain, because in the eyes of the law a change in the iden-
tity of the employer can alter or even eliminate a bargaining relationship. In 
this volume the airlines serve as an example of the serious adjustments in 
bargaining that are necessary when reorganization is widespread. 
The companies' double-breasted strategy, for example, produced larger 
corporations operating both union and nonunion carriers under different 
names (such as the Texas Air Corporation, which operates a nonunion sub-
sidiary, New York Air, and a unionized subsidiary, Continental). Cappelli 
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points out, as well, that the competitive rigors of the market have led to 
serious financial difficulties for a number of airlines, some of which have 
responded by seeking purchasers or mergers. Frank Lorenzo, president of the 
Texas Air Corporation, has been particularly active in all phases of airline 
reorganization, engaging in double breasting, buyouts, and mergers. He has 
also been identified by the unions in the industry as an opponent of unioniza-
tion and collective bargaining. When Texas Air tried to take over TWA, the 
unions went so far as to offer to negotiate concessions to an alternative buyer, 
Carl Icahn, in an effort to avoid a Lorenzo takeover. 
The Structure of Bargaining 
Bargaining structures closely reflect the make-up of the bargaining parties 
and, in turn, have much to do with the balance of power the parties bring to 
the bargaining table. The term bargaining structure refers to the size and 
scope of the units that engage in bargaining. Some bargaining structures 
encompass only a single department or a single plant, while others encompass 
two or more plants, or even an entire industry. Employers can bargain singly 
or collectively (for example, through a multi-employer association); and 
unions can bargain singly or in a coalition with other unions. Bargaining 
structure also refers to pattern setting and pattern following—that is, 
whether and to what extent a key agreement influences the terms of other 
agreements. Fundamentally, therefore, structural considerations in bargain-
ing raise questions of power. Who has the power to make decisions in 
bargaining? If bargaining is at the plant level, one can surmise that a con-
siderable amount of decision-making power will be in the hands of local com-
pany and union representatives. If bargaining is at the company or industry 
level, the balance of power is likely to shift to top union leaders and corporate 
officers (Weber 1967). Although the concept seems, at first blush, to be 
straightforward, on closer analysis bargaining structure can be quite subtle. 
The sources of this subtlety are several. For example, although the 
National Labor Relations Board technically delineates the size and scope of 
bargaining units, the so-called appropriate bargaining units specified by the 
board for purposes of determining union representation questions are fre-
quently not the basis on which negotiations or grievance administration 
occur. Even when appropriate bargaining units are plantwide or based on 
occupational groups within a plant, negotiations may be conducted on a 
company wide or even an industrywide basis. Basic steel is a good example of 
an industry that traditionally engaged in industrywide bargaining despite the 
fact that its appropriate bargaining units were technically plantwide in scope 
(Stieber 1980). 
A second source of subtlety in bargaining structure is that different issues 
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are often resolved at different levels of decision making. In many industries 
issues such as wages and fringe benefits may be negotiated at the company 
level, while others such as work rules are negotiated at the plant level. One of 
the best examples of how bargaining structure can exist on these multiple 
levels is the way grievances are handled in most bargaining relationships. 
Grievances are usually addressed initially at the department level and, if 
unsettled there, usually move to the plant and then to the company level. 
Accordingly, simple statements about the level at which collective bargaining 
occurs cannot be made in many cases. Unless the issue under discussion is 
identified, the level at which it will be decided cannot be known. 
A third source of subtlety in bargaining structure arises from the patterns 
that are set and followed in much of bargaining. Employees' desire to achieve 
settlements that match what other comparable workers receive and employ-
ers' desire to pay no more than their competitors do are among the most 
powerful motivations in collective bargaining negotiations. Those factors, 
and other forces as well, induce the bargaining parties to look closely at other 
bargaining settlements in choosing their goals for the next round of negotia-
tions. Sometimes these patterns are ill-defined because the parties take note of 
large numbers of settlements and their rough assessment of a common trend 
serves as a starting point for their negotiations. In other cases the patterns are 
well defined and obvious, as in the case of a company or industry that con-
siders itself to be in tandem with another company or industry (Dunlop 1957; 
Ross 1948; Bourdon 1979). 
The 1980s have brought significant changes in bargaining structures, 
both in the formal level at which negotiations and contract administration 
occur and in the traditional patterns that have been followed. Examples of 
both types of changes abound. The breakup of traditional industrywide 
negotiations in steel is one of the best examples of a major change in the for-
mal structure of negotiations {New York Times 1986a; Washington Post 
1986). The meatpacking industry is a good example of an industry in which 
traditional patterns have dissolved, with different companies achieving diver-
gent settlements depending on their aggressiveness in negotiations and on 
their financial health. 
Almost all of the industries studied in this volume have seen bargaining 
structure changes in response to changes in the technological, economic, and 
legal environments of the 1980s. Telecommunications, automobiles, tires, 
and airlines have all seen shifts in formal negotiating structures or traditional 
patterns, or both. 
The bargaining structure in the telecommunications industry was not 
particularly stable even before the breakup of AT&T. As Hendricks ex-
plains, the union had sought nationwide bargaining for many years but had 
achieved it, at least in a formal sense, only in 1974. The spinoff of the Bell 
System's regional operating companies has left the new bargaining structure 
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in doubt, but it seems clear that formal nationwide bargaining across the 
operating companies is over for the time being. The regional operating com-
panies seem unanimous in their opposition to nationwide bargaining; and 
since the formal bargaining units were never altered to reflect the emergence 
of a de facto nationwide negotiating structure in the 1970s, it seems likely 
that the companies will be able to maintain that opposition. Whether a tight 
tandem relationship or pattern will emerge among the regional operating 
companies cannot be predicted at this point with any confidence. 
In the automobile industry the changes in bargaining structure have been 
of great importance, but they have had little effect on either the formal bar-
gaining units or on the level at which the parties actually face each other in 
negotiations. Rather, the changes have largely been reflected in the break-
down of traditional pattern relationships within the industry and in the 
accompanying new heterogeneity of contract terms across the companies and 
among the plants within companies. In the early 1980s the major elements of 
the compensation and benefits packages contained in General Motors, Ford, 
and Chrysler contracts at the national level were no longer indistinguishable. 
Differences in their compensation packages reflected differences in their 
financial positions and in the nature of their production processes. Similarly, 
traditional pattern relationships among the major auto producers and the 
numerous small supplier companies have been under strain. As Katz has doc-
umented, in 1982 and in later negotiations between the UAW and the parts 
supply companies, their settlements have substantially broken from the 
assembly company patterns. The breakdown in auto industry patterns has 
had major implications for several other industries as well, including steel, 
nonferrous metals, tires, and agricultural machinery—all of which have 
traditionally closely scrutinized the settlements in autos. In fact, the automo-
bile settlements had traditionally established the key pattern for a significant 
portion of all manufacturing industries. Thus, auto settlements no longer 
serve as the pacesetters they once did. 
In the tire industry, although the formal structure of national bargaining 
on a company-by-company basis remains, other aspects of the bargaining 
structure have changed. In particular, as Karper points out, the ten-year 
experiment of the major tire producers with mutual strike insurance ended 
with the 1976 negotiations. For many years negotiated settlements in this 
industry followed the automobile pattern closely. Once bargaining unifor- \ 
mity within the automobile industry broke down, it was impossible to find an j 
auto pattern to follow. Bargaining in the tire industry also broke step under 
pressures caused by growing nonunion competition, growing factionalism 
within the URW, and the tire companies' new-found means of threatening 
the union economically with plant closings and layoffs. 
The bargaining structures in the airline industry also broke down, in the 
1980s, as previously local carriers and other new entrants joined the trunk 
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markets. The Deregulation Act of 1978 also brought about changes in the 
industry's bargaining structure by another means. The act, as Cappelli points 
out, outlawed the Mutual Assistance Pact (MAP) the trunk carriers had used 
as strike insurance. This has reduced employer solidarity in the face of labor 
conflict, but it has also served to offset, at least to some degree, the diminu-
tion of bargaining power the airline employees suffered because of increased 
competition in the deregulated market. The elimination of the MAP has been 
the one feature of the new environment that has been favorable to the airline 
unions but, as Cappelli makes clear, it has not served to protect them from 
the rigors of the competitive market. 
Police bargaining is a good example of a strictly local, or craft, structure 
of bargaining. Police officers almost never bargain with other municipal 
employees as one group, nor do the jurisdictions for which they work join 
forces with others in a multi-employer structure. By contrast, bargaining in 
professional sports is on an industrywide, multi-employer basis: All the 
owners in each sport band together for bargaining purposes, usually delegat-
ing the authority to make agreements to professional negotiators, and all sign 
contracts that apply uniformly to the teams and players in the league. 
It is apparent that the dominant trend in bargaining structures in the 
1970s and 1980s was toward more decentralized bargaining and a break-
down of previously robust patterns. One result of this trend was less 
standardization in labor contracts both within and across industries. Another 
result was a downward shift in decision-making power, from top industry 
and union leaders toward the regional and local representatives of the parties. 
In the 1980s, as in the years before World War II, the plant and the work-
place became important arenas for the determination of critical bargaining 
issues. 
The Bargaining Process 
Bargaining Issues 
Wages, fringe benefits, and work rules are always on the agenda in collective 
bargaining. The particular approaches the parties take to addressing these 
and other issues differ over time, however, depending on developments in the 
technological, economic, and legal environments within which bargaining 
occurs. The 1980s gave birth to a number of innovative contract provisions 
and agreements, especially but not exclusively those designed to promote 
greater cooperation between labor and management. Garnering much 
attention in the popular press, those experiments have included employee 
representation on company boards, greater use of joint union-management 
committees, greater reliance on profit or productivity sharing as a form of 
compensation, and the adoption of more flexible work rules, such as reduc-
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ing the number of job classifications that may exist under a collective bar-
gaining agreement (see, for example, Kochan and Barocci 1985, 15-28). 
Some groups of professional employees who are relatively new to collective 
bargaining, such as college faculty members, provided models for coopera-
tive and consultative ventures. Among the industries examined in this volume 
automobiles and professional sports were perhaps the most innovative in the 
contract language they employed to address both the traditional bargaining 
issues and the more novel ones. 
In automobiles one highly publicized development was the appointment 
of the president of the UAW to the board of directors of the Chrysler Corpo-
ration, a quid pro quo for the economic concessions that Chrysler so desper-
ately needed in 1979 to secure government loan guarantees that were to keep 
the company from bankruptcy. All of the major auto companies now have 
some form of quality-of-working-life or employee participation scheme as 
well, and all of those schemes have been designed to reshape, at least in part, 
the old adversarial relationship between the union and the companies. 
The automobile industry has also instituted pay systems that base com-
pensation much more directly on company performance than was the case in 
the past. To some extent profit sharing has been the price unions have 
demanded for short-term wage concessions, but in other respects it has par-
tially replaced other elements of the compensation package that based wages 
on formulas largely unconnected to company performance (for example, 
cost-of-living adjustments). 
In addition, as Katz explains, the Saturn agreement between the UAW 
and General Motors represented a remarkable experiment in joint planning 
for the future. Reached in mid-1985 the agreement specified bargaining and 
other workplace arrangements for a plant that was still some five years away 
from production. Although some experts in labor law had doubts about the 
legality of the Saturn agreement (because at the time the agreement was 
signed, Saturn had no employees who might have chosen or rejected union 
representation under the National Labor Relations Act's certification proce-
dures), other labor relations experts hailed the agreement—with its flexible 
work rules, broad job categories, and commitment to employee participa-
tion—as a fundamental improvement that augered well for collective bar-
gaining as an institution. 
It should be emphasized that the agricultural machinery industry, orga-
nized by the same union as autos and closely associated for many years with 
the auto pattern of settlements, has adopted virtually none of these innova-
tive approaches. While the collective bargaining process in the auto industry 
has been in upheaval, the parties in agricultural machinery have dealt with 
their most critical issues in basically the same fashion they did 30 years 
before. Seeber notes that the result has been a high level of conflict in this 
industry. 
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Collective bargaining agreements in professional sports contain a cornu-
copia of unusual contract provisions that deal with the special employment 
circumstances of professional athletes. Dworkin explains in detail the kinds 
of provisions that have been negotiated in baseball, basketball, football, 
and hockey to deal with the issue of player mobility among teams. Reserve 
clauses, salary arbitration, option years, offer sheets, compensation caps, 
and several other innovative approaches have all been tried, but the issue still 
remains in the forefront of sports negotiations. Players in the major sports are 
not easily replaced because the fans identify with their favorite stars, making 
each player a unique commodity with some degree of monopoly power. 
Nevertheless, these contract provisions are not necessarily novel, since the 
same issue also arises in other segments of the entertainment industry. 
Similarly, police collective bargaining agreements often contain unique 
language that reflects the unusual nature of the work police officers do. Some 
of the provisions that Delaney and Feuille have labeled as "law enforcement" 
provisions deal with topics, such as the use of firearms or restrictions on the 
location of an officer's residence, that are unheard of in most other labor 
contracts. As in professional sports these provisions are only new in the sense 
that collective bargaining is relatively new in the police industry. 
In the 1980s unions and employers throughout American industry nego-
tiated many innovative terms to address employment security issues. As 
industries faced recession, foreign competition, and deregulation, even em-
ployees high on seniority lists who had considered themselves immune to 
layoff faced the prospect of unemployment, and sometimes permanent dis-
placement. With employers demanding a variety of economic concessions at 
the bargaining table, unions have often made some form of job protection the 
quid pro quo for their agreement on cost-saving provisions. Airlines, auto-
mobiles, telecommunications, and agricultural machinery have all reached 
agreement on job security innovations. 
About half of the trunk airlines have granted some type of job security 
concessions, usually in exchange for union concessions that have lowered 
current labor costs. As Cappelli notes, the carriers most likely to grant job 
security concessions are those that do not believe those guarantees will prove 
costly, that is, those carriers that view themselves as having good growth 
prospects. 
The automobile contracts contain a variety of new approaches to the 
issue of job security. Katz discusses the employment guarantees for workers 
with 15 or more years' seniority contained in the 1982 Ford and General 
Motors contracts. These provisions emphasize guaranteed income streams 
for senior workers. Much more comprehensive employment guarantees were 
included in those contracts on an experimental basis for a small number of 
plants. The companies also made concessions in their plant-closing and out-
sourcing practices. 
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As Hendricks explains, the telecommunications unions began to nego-
tiate protection against anticipated employment changes before divestiture 
and deregulation actually came about. In their case the protections largely 
revolved around wages, benefits, and seniority for employees transferred 
within what was once the integrated AT&T system. 
Seeber notes that job security concerns in the agricultural machinery 
industry have also given rise to a variety of solutions. For example, the UAW 
obtained agreement on the "domestic content" of the output at International 
Harvester, on group incentives that allow for some wage flexibility, and on 
early warnings of plant closings. 
Perhaps the most widely publicized set of changes in bargaining issues 
during the late 1970s and, especially, the first half of the 1980s came in the 
form of concessionary bargaining. There is nothing new in the phenomenon 
of employers' coming to the bargaining table with their own strong demands, 
or of unions' conceding some of their terms and conditions of employment 
when the firm or the industry faces dire economic circumstances. The long 
post-World War II prosperity, however, had made such episodes the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Labor experts as well as workers had come to expect 
that the initiative in negotiations would be taken by unions and that the terms 
and conditions of unionized employees would steadily improve. The question 
of wage and benefit improvements was not if but how fast they would occur. 
The 1979 Chrysler agreement ushered in an era in which the "if" question 
came to the fore as large numbers of unions accepted wage reductions and 
work rule changes, initially to save financially strapped employers but later 
also to enable other employers to compete with those that had already won 
concessions. The steel and trucking industries witnessed substantial conces-
sions by unions in the 1980s. Among the industries studied here, agricultural 
machinery, automobiles, and airlines all engaged in concessionary bargaining 
along these lines. 
In the agricultural machinery industry concessions have almost exclu-
sively taken the form of pay cuts. The UAW has been reluctant to grant con-
cessions on work rules and has been willing, at least in the negotiations up to 
1986, to engage in vigorous strike action to make that policy stick. 
But the automobile industry provides an interesting contrast because here 
the UAW has been willing to agree to much more radical and innovative con-
cessions, including substantial changes in work rules. Why the UAW has 
been willing to grant broad-ranging concessions in autos and not in agricul-
tural machinery remains something of a mystery, although it is probably the 
result of differences in the personalities and dispositions of the UAW's auto 
and agricultural machinery leaders, the characteristics of the rank and file, 
the strategies of the employers, and the history and traditions of bargaining in 
the two industries. Certainly there have been wage and benefit concessions in 
automobiles, including the demise of the annual improvement factor, the 
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shift of some COLA payments into health or pension funds, and the negotia-
tion of contingent compensation schemes, such as bonuses and profit shar-
ing. As Katz points out, however, work rule changes appeared not only in the 
experimental Saturn agreement, but also in many of the existing auto plants. 
Most of the work rule changes were negotiated in local UAW contracts, and 
in 1982 and 1984 the Ford and General Motors national agreements specif-
ically authorized those local work rule negotiations. 
Economic concessions may have been more widespread and substantial 
in the airline industry than in any other. One of the principal forms of con-
cessions agreed to by the airline unions has been the adoption of two-tier 
wage plans in which new employees are paid on a scale lower than that of the 
existing employees. Some of the two-tier agreements allow new employees 
eventually to catch up to the more senior employees, while others do not. 
Those agreements have raised a host of strategic and legal questions, not the 
least of which is whether unions negotiating such agreements violate their 
duty of fair representation to new employees (Harvard Law Review 1985). 
In the past union negotiators were always prepared to grant concessions, 
but only when employers could persuade them that exceptionally threatening 
circumstances required that they be made. Unions feared that once they 
granted concessions, even to an enterprise on the verge of dissolution, they 
would not be able to hold the line with healthier firms. Any concessions, it 
was thought, could conceivably cause a union's wage structure to come 
tumbling down like a house of cards. In effect, during hard times unions pre-
ferred to maintain wages and benefits and allow employers to reduce labor 
costs by means of employment cutbacks. But in the 1980s many unions 
seemed willing to reverse that preference. In the last decade unions accepted 
significant wage concessions in exchange for employment security provisions 
and employment guarantees. And if union wage structures have not collapsed, 
they have seriously eroded, especially in manufacturing. Whether wage con-
cessions have on balance served to reduce employment losses is, however, a 
question that remains unanswered. 
Labor-Management Conflict 
Strike activity declined precipitously in the United States in the 1980s. To 
illustrate, in a typical year in the 1970s there were between 200 and 300 
strikes involving 1,000 or more workers (in 1974 there were 424 such 
strikes), but in 1984 there were only 62 such strikes and in 1985 only 54 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1986). (It might be noted that the government 
stopped collecting data on strikes involving fewer than 1,000 workers in 
1981.) Did American collective bargaining enter an era of industrial peace? 
It has been said in international relations that peace is not merely the 
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absence of war. Similarly, in labor relations peace is not merely the absence 
of strikes. True industrial peace is characterized by a climate of accommoda-
tion (if not cooperation), by each party's recognition of the legitimacy of the 
other party in the relationship, and by a willingness to compromise on divi-
sive issues. By this definition, many strike-free industries were not truly in a 
state of peace in the 1980s. Rather, the decline of strike activity is probably 
attributable to the realization by many unions that the strike weapon had lost 
much of its effectiveness in those years of economic decline, high unemploy-
ment, technological change, and conservative public policies. Historically, 
strike activity usually declined during recessions, and so the dramatic drop 
in strikes in the early 1980s might have been simply a cyclical response. When 
unemployment is high, union bargaining power is undercut because, among 
other reasons, employers have a ready supply of workers to replace strikers 
(see, for example, Kaufman 1981). 
Also contributing to the decline, however, was the fact that many em-
ployers appeared more willing to continue to operate during a strike than 
they were before. Many of those that did continue operations during strikes 
permanently replaced some or all striking employees and succeeded in break-
ing the union. Others simply deployed supervisors and nonstriking employees 
in an attempt to wring more favorable settlements from the striking unions 
(Perry, Dramer, and Schneider 1982). The Reagan administration had set the 
tone for this development in 1981 when it replaced the striking air traffic con-
trollers and decertified their union (Northrup 1984). The significance of that 
action was not lost on a large number of employers in both the public and the 
private sectors. Moreover, President Reagan's appointment of new members 
to the National Labor Relations Board, members who seemed less sympa-
thetic to unions, also appears to have made employers more willing to deal 
aggressively with unions in strike situations. In airlines, for example, the em-
ployers began to operate during strikes in the 1980s. 
Telecommunications is a good example of an industry in which modern 
technology allows production to continue relatively unhindered, at least dur-
ing the early stages of a strike. Telephone companies have long sought to 
maintain service during strikes, and the advancing automation of telephone 
services has steadily increased their capacity to do so successfully. Although 
telephone installation and maintenance may have to be postponed during a 
strike, basic telephone service is now so completely automated and computer-
ized that the great bulk of telephone services can be provided without the 
consumer noticing any change. Supervisory employees, for example, can be 
shifted to essential maintenance work to keep the system operating. These 
expediencies do put pressure on the employer, however, and that pressure 
increases as time goes on with backlogs of unattended administrative func-
tions and service orders and with growing fatigue among the supervisory 
employees, who have to spend long shifts doing tasks that have become 
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unfamiliar. Nonetheless, the companies' capacity to continue to provide basic 
services weakens the bargaining power of telecommunications employees in 
strike situations. Still, as Hendricks points out, increased competition among 
providers of long distance telephone service may have increased the vulner-
ability of AT&T to strikes. Competition raises the possibility that a strike 
may mean lost customers. Moreover, the breakup of the Bell System also 
means that the regional operating companies cannot draw on management 
and supervisory personnel from all over the country to assist them during a 
regional or local strike. 
In contrast to telecommunications, the airlines' recent attempts to oper-
ate during strikes have often been expressly designed to rid the companies of 
their burden of dealing with the union. For example, the recession in the 
industry in the early 1980s and the ready supply of qualified pilots allowed 
Continental to replace nearly all of its unionized pilots. Even if their replace-
ment did not succeed, in the end, in removing the pilots' union, the replace-
ment of higher paid senior pilots with junior pilots substantially reduced 
Continental's operating expenses. 
The Future of Collective Bargaining 
The decade of the 1980s was a time of ferment for the institution of collective 
bargaining. Unions and employers had to respond to changes in the techno-
logical, economic, and legal environments that were unprecedented in the 
post-World War II period. Recession and economic stagnation, foreign and 
nonunion competition, deregulation and divestiture—all served to shift the 
initiative in collective bargaining from unions to employers. One result of this 
shift was a greater willingness of unions to grant concession on wages, bene-
fits, and work rules. Somewhat overshadowed by concession bargaining was 
an equally significant development—the increased willingness of many 
employers and unions to enter into innovative arrangements in which issues 
formerly outside the scope of bargaining became the focus of their concern. If 
agreements that sought to improve the quality of working life, to promote 
union and employee participation in business decision making, to base pay 
on profits and other measures of employee and firm performance, to enhance 
the employment security of union members, and to experiment with other 
forms of workplace reform did not become the norm, they certainly became 
more commonplace in the 1980s. Those developments had the effect of 
broadening the scope of bargaining beyond the parties' traditionally narrow 
focus on wages, hours, and conditions of employment. In effect, many unions 
traded short-term economic concessions for an expanded role in the enter-
prise. Paradoxically, these trade-offs, the ostensible result of unions' weak-
ness in the 1980s, might serve to strengthen their position in the long run. 
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The loss of members in traditional union strongholds caused the labor 
movement to undertake an intense self-appraisal. In 1982, for example, the 
AFL-CIO established the Committee on the Evolution of Work, consisting of 
top international union and AFL-CIO leaders, to assess the condition of 
workers and their unions and to make recommendations for the "renewal and 
regeneration" of the American labor movement. Among several noteworthy 
recommendations in the committee's 1985 report was a proposal to create 
new categories of union membership for workers not employed in organized 
bargaining units. Noting that the number of former union members in the 
labor force was greater than the number of current union members (27 mil-
lion versus 20 million), the committee believed that a new category of mem-
bership might serve to bring those former members back into the union fold, 
even if circumstances prevented unions from representing them directly in 
collective bargaining (AFL-CIO 1985). 
By the end of 1986 some 30 international unions had established, or were 
planning to establish, the category of "associate member." One of the first 
benefits offered to associate members was a consumer credit card that carried 
an interest rate significantly below the rate on other cards issued by the 
nation's banks. At the same time the AFL-CIO was laying plans to offer both 
associate and full members an array of financial and consumer services, such 
as discounts on consumer goods; inexpensive life, auto, and homeowner 
insurance; and money market and mutual funds designed especially for union 
members. All of those services, it should be noted, were to be financed or 
subsidized by the union movement itself, and not by employers through col-
lective bargaining {New York Times 1986b and 1987; and discussions with 
AFL-CIO leaders in Washington, D.C., in November 1986). This historic 
shift in organizing strategy could mean that in the future labor will emphasize 
its collective purchasing power even more than its collective bargaining 
power. But it was the hope of the AFL-CIO that members attracted to the 
movement because of the new services would eventually recognize the advan-
tages of collective bargaining as a method of improving their welfare. 
As the 1980s drew to a close, the wave of corporate mergers, acquisi-
tions, bankruptcies, and reorganizations continued without abatement in 
industries such as autos, steel, agricultural machinery, oil refining, and truck-
ing. Those events disrupted many stable bargaining relationships. Many cor-
porations continued to shut down their older, unionized facilities and open 
new, nonunion plants; move their production facilities overseas; form new, 
nonunion subsidiaries; or subcontract part of their work to nonunion or for-
eign producers. The effect of these corporate actions on collective bargaining 
is well documented in this volume's industry studies. Corporate reorganiza-
tions and relocations were clearly another factor that caused a shift in the 
balance of power in labor relations from unions to employers, and there is no 
sign that a reversal in this trend will occur in the near future. 
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periodic and prolonged recessions or economic stagnation and decline, collec-
tive bargaining (and its capacity to initiate workplace reforms) will suffer. 
The future of collective bargaining will also depend on the direction of 
public policy. In the 1980s deregulation shook the roots of collective bar-
gaining in several key industries. But now that deregulation has largely been 
completed, it is not likely to continue to have a critical influence on bargain-
ing relationships. Collective bargaining was clearly weakened in deregulated 
industries, such as telecommunications, airlines, and trucking, but it did sur-
vive. And having survived, it is not likely to grow any weaker in those 
industries. 
More important than regulatory policies to the future of collective bar-
gaining in American industry will be the direction taken by the National 
Labor Relations Board and the courts. Having failed to achieve congressional 
approval of labor law reform in the 1970s, the union movement then saw 
itself as the victim of a long series of adverse decisions by those agencies in the 
1980s. Whether those decisions were right or wrong, and whether they had 
the effect, as labor asserts, of weakening unions and collective bargaining, 
are questions that can be debated. It must be a significant sign, however, that 
labor's frustration with contemporary public policies grew to such heights 
that several important union leaders seemed prepared to see the Taft-Hartley 
Act scrapped and to return the "law of the jungle" {New York Times 1985c, 
quoting Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO). The future vitality of the 
union movement and collective bargaining, then, may very well depend on 
whether the public policy apparatus continues to be dominated by a conser-
vative, pro-business ideology or turns in the direction of a liberal, more pro-
union one. Any such turn will itself depend, of course, on the outcomes of 
future presidential and congressional elections and, ultimately, on public 
opinon. 
Managerial attitudes and philosophies will also help determine the future 
of collective bargaining. Management ideologies have taken marked swings 
throughout the twentieth century. In the early part of the century, manage-
ment opposition to unions was the norm, but by the 1950s the sociologist 
Daniel Bell was writing about "the end of ideology," which in industrial rela-
tions presumably meant managerial acceptance of unions and collective bar-
gaining (Bell 1961). It was common—though perhaps only fashionable—for 
industry leaders in the 1950s to laud the value of collective bargaining in a 
free society. If a consensus among managers on the virtues of free collective 
bargaining ever did exist (and scholars still debate this point), it certainly fell 
apart in the 1960s and 1970s. In fact, in the 1980s it was difficult to find a 
manager who had a good word to say about unions or collective bargaining. 
Managerial attitudes tended in recent years to range from grudging accep-
tance of unions to aggressive opposition. At the extreme some managers, 
albeit a minority, were willing to violate the law (for example, by firing union 
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sympathizers) to avoid unionization. If the dominant management values 
continue to be strongly anti-union, the prospects for a revitalization of collec-
tive bargaining do not appear to be promising (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 
1986). 
Finally, the future of collective bargaining most certainly depends on the 
future vitality of the union movement itself, and particularly on the effective-
ness and energy of union leaders. If the labor movement is able to generate 
fresh ideas and charismatic leaders, as it managed to do in the 1930s, all 
other obstacles to the regeneration of collective bargaining may fade in 
importance. A sign that renewed energies may be coursing through the labor 
movement was the AFL-CIO's adoption in 1985 of a new organizing strategy, 
discussed above. It might be contended that there is equally a need for labor 
to develop a new collective bargaining strategy. During most of the post-
World War II period, union leaders like the UAW's Walter Reuther could be 
counted upon to generate new and creative ideas in collective bargaining. But 
by the 1980s many union leaders seemed to be suffering from a near exhaus-
tion of ideas. The labor force of the future will consist not only of highly edu-
cated, skilled, white-collar workers but also of millions of less educated, less 
skilled workers, many of whom will be minorities and immigrants (see, for 
example, Kerr and Staudohar 1986, 36-72). Labor's challenge, therefore, 
will be to develop a bargaining strategy that will appeal to this variegated 
constituency. 
The shape of an effective bargaining strategy can now be only dimly 
perceived. An indisputable premise is that an effective bargaining strategy 
must entail labor's energetic representation of its members' interests. Beyond 
that general statement lie murky waters. It is not likely that labor will aban-
don its traditional focus on bread-and-butter issues, although it may never 
again be as inflexible on those issues as it was before the concessionary era. It 
is also a fair guess that we shall witness the continued diffusion of workplace 
innovations throughout the unionized sector. But today's innovations will be 
old hat tomorrow. To revitalize collective bargaining the union movement 
will need to come up with even more creative strategies to suit the needs and 
desires of the workers in the next century. 
All told, it is not surprising that scholars and practitioners alike have 
begun to debate whether collective bargaining in American industry had 
reached a historic turning point: Was collective bargaining permanently 
changed by the developments of the 1980s? Or did it merely experience a 
temporary detour from its historic path? Derber has called the former view-
point the "new-stage theory" and the latter the "rerun theory" (Derber 1983; 
see also Cullen 1985). Clearly, collective bargaining was not as stable in the 
1980s as it had been in the 1950s, nor was it as turbulent as it had been in the 
1930s. There were, as this book amply illustrates, significant changes in the 
1980s, and many of the changes will certainly have a lasting impact on the 
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practice of collective bargaining. But on the other hand, nothing occurred in 
the 1980s that changed the fundamental character of collective bargaining in 
most American industries. The key features of the institution, which are aptly 
described by the systems framework used throughout this volume, remained 
unaltered by the developments of the last decade. In t ruth, in every era collec-
tive bargaining has been characterized by both stability and change. The 
institution was never as static as some believe it was . Similarly, since its 
inception in the nineteenth century collective bargaining has always had cer-
tain unchanging features. In the 1980s collective bargaining in American 
industry was , indeed, in a period of transition to a "new stage." But, we 
maintain, collective bargaining has always been a dynamic institution: It has 
always been in a state of transition from the knowable past to the uncertain 
future. 
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